







Jobs, FDI and Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Evidence from Firm-Level Data 
 
Sotiris Blanas, Adnan Seric and Christian Viegelahn 
 
The Department of Economics 
Lancaster University Management School 











All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, 
provided that full acknowledgement is given. 
 
 
LUMS home page: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/lums/ 
Jobs, FDI and Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Evidence from Firm-Level Data∗
Sotiris Blanas† Adnan Seric‡ Christian Viegelahn§
29 January 2016
Abstract
Using firm-level data, we study the differences in the quantity and quality of jobs offered
by foreign-owned and domestic firms in Sub-Saharan Africa, and identify how country-level
institutional factors determine these differences. After controlling for numerous firm-level
characteristics in regressions, we find that foreign-owned firms, especially those whose
main business purpose is to serve the home or foreign markets, offer more stable and
secure jobs than domestic firms. Specifically, they have more permanent full-time workers,
a lower probability of offering temporary work and employ less temporary workers. The
job stability and security advantage of foreign-owned firms is smaller in countries with
higher firing costs and governance quality, where domestic firms are induced to offer more
stable and secure jobs. In addition, foreign-owned firms are less likely to offer unpaid work
and have less of these workers. They also invest more in training, especially of managers,
and pay higher wages to non-production and managerial workers, particularly those firms
whose main business purpose is to serve the home or foreign markets. A higher wage to
production workers is paid only by those whose owners are from high-income countries.
The wage premia of foreign-owned firms are lower in countries with higher governance and
social policy standards, where domestic firms are induced to pay higher wages.
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1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries has expanded rapidly in recent
decades, resulting in a voluminous literature on how it affects their economies (Blomstro¨m
and Kokko, 1998). Two questions that the literature has aimed at answering are whether
foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) create jobs in the host country and whether these
jobs are of higher quality than those created by domestic firms. For an individual worker, the
level of stability and security of employment,1 the opportunities for training and development
of human capital, and the level of wages are among the most notable aspects of job quality.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature in four ways. First, we provide novel empir-
ical evidence on the differences in the quantity and quality of jobs offered by foreign-owned
and domestic firms in Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, in addition to common measures of job
quantity and job quality such as total employment and wages, we use measures based on firm-
level information on employment by contract type, unpaid work, and training expenditure by
type of worker and identify their association with foreign ownership. Third, we identify the
association of job quantity and job quality with additional characteristics of foreign-owned
firms, namely, the location of the parent company, the mode of foreign investment, the ma-
jority foreign ownership status, and the principal motive for foreign investment. Finally, we
identify how country-level institutional factors such as firing costs, governance quality, and
social inclusion determine the differences in job quantity and quality between foreign-owned
and domestic firms.
To focus the empirical analysis on Sub-Saharan Africa seems particularly relevant as there
is very limited knowledge of the implications of inward FDI for the quantity and quality of
jobs in the region. This knowledge, however, is important in order to better understand the
role that the upward-trending FDI into the region can play in absorbing the rapidly growing
working-age population into high-quality jobs over the coming decades. Indeed, Sub-Saharan
Africa has increased remarkably in recent decades its capacity in attracting FDI. Annual
FDI flows into Africa increased from $2.8 billion to $54.1 billion between 1990 and 2015,
increasing the FDI stock from 13.6% of GDP to 32.1% over the same time period (UNCTAD
and UNIDO, 2011; UNCTAD, 2016). In addition, Sub-Saharan Africa will be the region with
the fastest growth in working-age population worldwide, predicted to increase by 55.3% over
the coming 15 years, from 548 million in 2015 to 851 million in 2030, according to projections
1Employment stability refers to the duration of a typical match between an employer and an employee. It
depends on voluntary job change (e.g. quit) or involuntary job change (e.g. layoff). Employment security
refers to the prevention from involuntary job change. Put differently, it refers to the ability of a worker to
retain a desirable job (Valletta, 1999).
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of the United Nations Population Division.
The empirical analysis draws on firm-level data from the UNIDO Africa Investor Survey
2010. The dataset comprises 6497 formally registered firms which are either domestic or
foreign-owned and covers all economic sectors of 19 Sub-Saharan African countries.2 The
firm-level information refers to the year 2009. The parent companies of foreign-owned firms
are based in countries of all income classes, namely, in high-income countries and low/middle-
income countries inside and outside Sub-Saharan Africa.
The dataset is well-suited for our analysis. First, its detailed information on labour allows
for the construction of numerous measures of the quantity and quality of employment within
firms. In particular, we create variables for total employment and its decomposition into
permanent full-time, temporary and part-time employment. With additional variables, we
capture unpaid work and permanent full-time employment by type of worker, namely, pro-
duction, non-production and managerial worker. Similarly, we create variables for female and
foreign permanent full-time employment by type of worker, as well as training intensity and
wages by type of worker. Second, based on additional information on foreign-owned firms, we
identify greenfield FDI and mergers and acquisitions (M&As), majority-owned foreign affili-
ates (MOFAs), and their main business purpose such as access to new markets, cost-effective
production, and access to inputs.3 Third, information on main characteristics and activities
of domestic and foreign-owned firms allows us to incorporate essential firm-level controls in
regressions for empirical identification purposes.
In order to examine the potential role of country-level institutional factors in the quantity
and quality of jobs offered by foreign-owned relative to domestic firms, we combine the firm-
level data with relevant data at the country-level. More specifically, we use measures of
firing costs and social inclusion made available in the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI), as proxies for the host country’s level of employment protection and social
policy standards, respectively. We also use the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG),
developed by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, as an overall measure of institutional quality in
the host country.
To empirically identify the quantity and quality of jobs offered by foreign-owned firms
relative to domestic firms, we regress different measures of job quantity and job quality on
a dummy variable indicating the foreign ownership status of the firm. In all regressions,
2Despite the relatively large share of own-account workers under informal employment, 32.9% of the region’s
workers in 2015 were in wage and salaried employment (ILO Trends Econometric Models, April 2016). Hence,
the type of employment covered by the survey represents a significant fraction of the region’s workforce.
3Greenfield FDI is defined as the creation of a new foreign operation as wholly-owned enterprise or joint
venture. MOFAs are defined as firms whose foreign ownership share is at least 50%.
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we control for a variety of firm-level characteristics and for unobserved heterogeneity across
countries and industries. We estimate an OLS and a probit model when job quantity and
job quality are captured by continuous and dummy variables, respectively. By interacting
the dummy for foreign ownership with country-level variables, we identify how institutional
factors such as firing costs, governance quality and social inclusion determine the differences
in job quantity and job quality between foreign-owned and domestic firms.
The empirical analysis allows us to derive several findings on the association of job quan-
tity and job quality with foreign ownership in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a first finding, we
document that foreign-owned firms tend to offer more stable and secure jobs than domestic
firms. Although foreign-owned firms have lower total employment, they employ a higher share
of permanent full-time workers. They are also less likely to offer temporary work and if they
do so, they employ a lower share of workers under this type of contract than domestic firms.
Higher job stability and security in foreign-owned firms may be an indication that MNEs want
to ensure that their foreign affiliates are able to run critical operations such as the production
of intermediate and final output and the service of the home and foreign markets according to
the headquarters’ demands. It may also indicate corporate social responsibility considerations
(OECD and ILO, 2008) and adherence to international MNE standards in workplace practices
(ILO, 2006), aiming at protecting the MNE’s reputation.
By accounting for additional characteristics of foreign-owned firms, we find that higher job
stability and security is offered by foreign-owned firms whose parents are located both inside
and outside Sub-Saharan Africa. Higher job stability and security is also offered by foreign-
owned firms whose main business purpose is to serve the home or new foreign markets, and
to collaborate with a local firm in the country. The latter evidence suggest that the service
of the home and foreign markets by foreign affiliates and the creation of partnerships in the
host country are crucial business activities that entail the creation of more stable and secure
jobs within these types of firms.
Another finding is that foreign-owned firms are less likely to offer unpaid work and in case
they do offer unpaid work, they have a lower share of unpaid workers in total salaried and non-
salaried employment than domestic firms.4 The lower dependence of foreign-owned firms on
unpaid work is driven by those whose parents are located outside Sub-Saharan Africa. There
are no statistically significant associations of greenfield FDI, MOFA status, and the main
4Although all firms in the sample are formally registered, the share of firms which offer unpaid work is
not negligible, as it amounts to 8.6%. Among foreign-owned firms, 6.2% of these offer unpaid work, while the
corresponding share among domestic firms is 10%. Unpaid work in the formal sector is usually offered to family
members or apprentices. The data, however, do not allow us to distinguish between unpaid work offered to
family and non-family members or to apprentices and non-apprentices.
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business purpose of the firm with the probability that it offers unpaid work and its share
of unpaid workers. In addition, among foreign-owned firms, only those whose main business
purpose is to collaborate with a local partner in the country have a higher probability of
offering part-time work and employ a higher share of workers under this type of contract.
Within the group of permanent full-time workers, foreign-owned firms have a higher share
of production workers and a lower share of non-production workers. We fail to find statis-
tically significant differences between foreign-owned and domestic firms in terms of female
employment. Instead, foreign-owned firms have higher shares of total foreign employment
and of foreign production, non-production, and managerial workers. These higher shares may
be deemed as transfer of critical human capital to foreign affiliates from other parts of the
MNE such as the parent company or a sister affiliate (Moran, 2007; Coniglio et al., 2016).
An additional finding is that the gap in the stability and security of jobs offered by
foreign-owned and domestic firms is smaller in countries with higher firing costs and higher
governance quality. In particular, the higher share of permanent full-time employment of
foreign-owned firms relative to domestic firms decreases with higher firing costs and higher
governance quality, while their lower share of temporary employment increases. Also, their
lower probability of offering temporary work increases with higher firing costs. Higher firing
costs imply higher employment protection and better bargaining terms of workers vis-a`-vis
their employers, while higher governance quality implies a higher overall institutional quality
in the country. Hence, the job stability and security gap is smaller because domestic firms in
these countries are likely to be induced to offer more stable and secure jobs than in countries
with lower firing costs and lower governance quality. Firing costs and governance quality
play no role in the association of foreign ownership with the probability and share of unpaid
work. Firing costs also play no role in the association of foreign ownership with the shares of
permanent full-time production, non-production, and managerial workers.
Two more findings of this paper are that foreign-owned firms tend to invest more in training
of their employees and to pay higher wages than domestic firms. In particular, foreign-owned
firms have a higher average training intensity and higher training intensity for managerial
workers. They also pay a wage which is, on average, 31.9% higher than the wage paid by
domestic firms. The average wage premium of foreign-owned firms is attributed to higher
wages paid by these firms to non-production and managerial workers. The wages for these
two types of workers are higher than those in domestic firms by 25.4% and 32%, respectively.
The greater investment in training by foreign-owned firms, as well as the wage premium
that they pay –especially in developing countries–, are in line with previous findings in the
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literature.5
When we consider additional characteristics of foreign-owned firms, we find that the aver-
age wage premium and the wage premium to managerial workers are paid by foreign-owned
firms whose parents are located outside Sub-Saharan Africa, while the wage premium to non-
production workers is paid by foreign-owned firms whose parents are located both inside and
outside Sub-Saharan Africa. Interestingly, a wage premium of 24.2% to production workers
is paid only by foreign-owned firms whose parents are located in high-income countries. The
wage premia to non-production and managerial workers are also paid by foreign-owned firms
whose main business purpose is to serve the home or new foreign markets. This suggests that
non-production workers and especially managers may undertake administrative, supervisory
and managerial tasks which are crucial for the firm in order to serve the home and foreign
markets through exports. For example, Antra`s et al. (2008) emphasise the essential role of
managers in the foreign affiliate when it trades with its parent, as they supervise production
workers by dealing with routine problems faced by the latter. This way, the MNE saves on
communication costs, since the supervisory role would have otherwise been undertaken by top
managers in the parent company.
By contrast, foreign-owned firms which were created as greenfield FDI pay lower wages
to managerial workers as compared to previously domestic firms which became foreign-owned
through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and to firms which remain domestic. A possible
explanation is the “cherry-picking” argument (Almeida, 2007). That is, the main target of
foreign investors for M&As is likely to be domestic firms which have higher productivity and
greater human capital than the average domestic firm and thus already pay a wage premium
to their managers. In addition, foreign-owned firms whose main business purpose is to join
a local partner pay a lower wage to production workers. If this collaboration implies that
production-intensive tasks take place within the local partner, then production workers in
these firms may add lower value to the production of output and thus receive a lower wage.
As a final finding, we document that country-level institutional factors such as governance
quality and social inclusion play an important role in determining the wage differences be-
tween foreign-owned and domestic firms. The wage gap for managerial workers is smaller in
countries with higher governance quality and greater social inclusion. Greater social inclu-
sion also decreases the average wage gap and the wage gap for production workers. Higher
5For evidence on the greater investment in training of foreign-owned firms, see among others: Gershenberg
(1987), Filer et al. (1995), World Bank (1997), and Barthel et al. (2011). For evidence on wage premia of
foreign-owned firms, see among others: te Velde and Morrissey (2003), Strobl and Thornton (2004), Lipsey
and Sjo¨holm (2004), Sjo¨holm and Lipsey (2006), and Coniglio et al. (2015).
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governance quality implies a more solid wage bargaining setting and a better business regu-
latory environment, while greater social inclusion implies higher social policy standards. One
plausible explanation for the smaller wage premia in such countries is that domestic firms are
induced to pay higher wages than in countries with lower governance quality and social policy
standards. This is also in line with recent evidence for the lack of wage premia of foreign-
owned firms in developed countries, where institutional quality and social policy standards are
relatively high (Heyman et al., 2007; Huttunen, 2007; Andrews et al., 2009; Malchow-Møller
et al., 2013).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the
construction of variables, while Section 3 describes the econometric model. Section 4 presents
the main empirical results. Section 5 concludes and provides suggestions for future research.
2 Data
In this section, we describe the data employed in the empirical analysis and the construction of
firm- and country-level variables incorporated in the econometric model. A short description
of the variables is included in Table 14.
2.1 Firm-level
Our firm-level data source is the UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010. The aim of the survey
was the collection of information about firms with operations in Sub-Saharan Africa and
their assessment of the local business environment. It was designed to cover a representative
sample of “for-profit” public and private firms in all sectors of the economy for the financial
year 2009. All firms are registered and are either domestic or foreign-owned. In total, the
dataset comprises 6497 firms in 19 Sub-Saharan African countries. For each firm within a
country, stratified sampling was implemented by its economic sub-sector, number of employees
and ownership. Face-to-face interviews were conducted, in most cases with the most senior
decision maker within the firm.6 As monetary variables are in national currencies, we convert
these into US dollars (USD). We draw currency exchange rate data from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (WDI).
Foreign ownership variables
A firm is defined as foreign-owned if the ownership share held by a foreign investor is at
6For details concerning the design and implementation of the survey, see UNIDO (2011).
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least 10%. Panel A of Table 1 reveals that there are 4094 domestic and 2403 foreign-owned
firms, accounting for 63% and 37% of the total sample, respectively. The share of foreign-
owned firms by country varies from 21% in Niger to 53% in Madagascar. Panel B of Table 1
displays the sectors to which domestic and foreign-owned firms belong. The sectors with the
highest shares of foreign-owned firms are mining and agriculture, where more than half of the
firms are foreign-owned. In manufacturing, services, as well as in electricity, gas and water
supply and construction roughly one third of the firms are foreign-owned.
The parent companies of foreign-owned firms are located in high-income and low/middle-
income countries inside and outside Sub-Saharan Africa. These different parent location types
capture the heterogeneity in business culture and business practices across foreign-owned
firms. We include the country of a parent company in the group of high-income countries
(HI), if it is at the top income level of the World Bank Historical Country Classification by
Income for the year 2010. Instead, if it is classified as an upper-middle-income, lower-middle-
income or low-income country outside Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), we include it in the group
of non-SSA low/middle-income countries (LMI). Table 2 reveals that most of the foreign firms
are owned by investors located in high-income countries and in low/middle-income countries
outside Sub-Saharan Africa.
Information on five different modes of foreign investment allows us to identify greenfield
FDI and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The creation of a new operation as wholly-
owned enterprise and the creation of a new operation as joint venture capture greenfield FDI.
Instead, purchase of pre-existing assets from local owners, purchase of pre-existing assets from
foreign private owners and purchase of pre-existing state-owned assets capture M&As. We also
identify majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs) as firms whose foreign investor holds at
least 50% of their ownership share. In addition, based on information on the principal motive
for foreign investment, we identify the main business purpose of foreign-owned firms and
ultimately, different types of FDI or combinations of these. Specifically, access to new markets
as the principal motive for foreign investment captures horizontal and export-platform FDI.
Lower production costs, access to natural resources and inputs, collaboration with a specific
partner, and exporting to the home country capture vertical FDI. Finally, the benefits from a
trade agreement capture all three FDI types. Table 2 reveals that the group of foreign-owned
firms is dominated by those created as greenfield FDI, by majority-owned foreign affiliates
(MOFAs), and by those whose main business purpose is to access new markets.
7
Job quantity and job quality variables
With regards to information on labour, we have data on the total number of permanent
full-time, temporary and part-time employees, whose summation yields total employment.
The average firm has 184 employees, as shown in Table 3. The standard deviation and
the minimum and maximum values reveal that firms are very heterogeneous in terms of the
size of their workforce. The mean shares of permanent full-time, temporary, and part-time
employment in total employment indicate that the composition of total employment in the
average firm is 80% permanent full-time, 17% temporary, and 3% part-time. In addition,
Table 2 reveals that 55% and 16% of the total sample of firms employ temporary and part-
time workers, respectively. Although unpaid work is predominantly observed in the informal
sector of the economy, it is not uncommon in the formal sector, where it is mostly offered to
family members and apprentices (Taylor, 2004). In our sample that includes only firms which
are registered and are part of the formal economy, we observe that there is a non-negligible
fraction of firms, amounting to 8.6% of the total sample, that offer unpaid work (Table 2).
The data, however, do not allow us to distinguish between unpaid work offered to family and
non-family members or to apprentices and non-apprentices. The share of unpaid work in total
salaried and non-salaried employment7 in the average firm is 1% (Table 3).
Within the group of permanent full-time employees, we have information on the number of
production and manual workers, the number of clerical, administrative and sales workers, as
well as the number of technical, supervisory and managerial workers. For simplicity, we label
workers in the first group as production workers, those in the second group as non-production
workers, and those in the third group as managers. This information is also available for
female and foreign workers. According to Table 3, production workers in the average firm
account for a higher share in total permanent full-time employment than non-production and
managerial workers. Female and foreign workers account for 26% and 5% of total permanent
full-time employment. In addition, female workers account for a higher share in the group
of non-production workers than in the groups of production and managerial workers, while
foreign workers account for a higher share in the group of managerial workers than in the
other two groups.
Other aspects of job quality are the training and wages offered to employees. The dataset
provides information on whether a firm provides internal and external training to its em-
ployees, as well as on total training expenditure and its decomposition by type of worker.
7Total salaried and non-salaried employment is the sum of permanent full-time, temporary, part-time and
unpaid workers.
8
According to Table 2, around half of the firms in the sample provide internal or external
training to their employees. Table 3 shows that the ratio of total expenditure in training
to the total number of permanent full-time employees in the average firm amounts to $6.4.
Also, the average expenditure in training of managerial workers to the total number of these
workers is greater than the average ratios of expenditure in training of production and non-
production workers to the number of workers in the corresponding groups. In addition, the
wage per employee of the average firm, as the ratio of the total wage bill to the total number of
permanent full-time employees,8 is roughly $1400. Finally, managerial workers in the average
firm receive a higher monthly wage than production and non-production workers.
Additional firm-level variables
We measure firm size with the total value of sales and labour productivity with the ratio
of total sales to total permanent full-time employment. We also compute skill intensity as the
share of managerial workers in total permanent full-time employment, and capital and input
intensity as the ratios of total capital stock and total value of inputs to total permanent full-
time employment, respectively. The age of the firm is the number of years since its foundation,
while the total number of domestic and foreign affiliated establishments serves as a measure
of the size of the whole (multinational) enterprise. The summary statistics for these variables
in Table 3 point to salient firm heterogeneity along these dimensions.
Based on information on the number of local suppliers that a firm has and the value of work
that it contracts out to them, as well as on the number of its suppliers abroad, Table 2 shows
that the majority of firms in the sample engages in local and foreign backward linkages. The
same table shows that the majority of firms also engages in local forward linkages, based on
information on the number of local buyers that a firm has and the value of work sub-contracted
to it by other local firms. By contrast, firms which engage in exports are relatively few in the
sample, as indicated by information on their aggregate export values. Finally, information
on the main source of competition for the main product that is sold in the domestic market
reveals that the majority of the firms in the sample face competition mostly from domestic
firms, rather than from foreign-owned firms based in the country or from imports.
8This ratio is just a proxy for the average wage. While the total wage bill includes supplementary benefits
which are given only to permanent full-time workers, the denominator does not include temporary and part-
time workers, whose wages are part of the total wage bill. However, when temporary and part-time workers are
added to the denominator, this ratio is identical to the benchmark one for 5621 out of the 6497 observations.
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2.2 Country-level
In order to identify how employment protection, institutional quality and social policy deter-
mine the relationship between the quantity and quality of jobs and foreign ownership, we use
relevant country-level variables. Firing costs proxy for the level of employment protection.
They are measured as the number of weeks that a worker is paid after being laid off. We draw
data on this measure from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Column
1 of Table 4 shows that our firing cost measure for the year 2009 ranges between 13 weeks
in Uganda and 178 weeks in Ghana and Zambia, with the sample mean being equal to 59.6
weeks.
We also use the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), developed by the Mo Ibrahim
Foundation, in order to take into account of the quality of institutions within a country. IIAG
is an overall index of governance quality which comprises the rule of law, accountability,
personal safety, national security, participation, rights, gender, public management, business
environment, infrastructure, rural sector, welfare, education, and health. For the construction
of this index, data for the 14 sub-categories are collected from 33 separate data providers. The
overall index of governance quality ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 is the best possible
score within the group of 54 African countries between 2000 and the latest data year. Column
2 of Table 4 shows that the governance quality index in 2009 ranges between 43 in Niger and
75.2 in Cape Verde, with the sample mean being equal to 54.4.
The social inclusion measure provided by the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institu-
tional Assessment (CPIA) proxies for a country’s social policy standards. Its construction is
based on the assessment of the quality of policies related to gender equality, equity of public
resource use, the building up of human resources, social protection and environmental sustain-
ability. It is a rating between 1 and 6, with higher values indicating higher social inclusion.
According to column 3 of Table 4, the measure of social inclusion for the year 2009 ranges
from 3.1 in Cameroon and Niger to 4.3 in Cape Verde, with the sample mean being equal to
3.5.
3 Econometric model
In order to study the association of the quantity and quality of jobs offered by firm z in
country c and industry j with its foreign ownership status, we estimate the following model:
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JQzcj = α+ β1 ∗ foreignzcj + β2 ∗ controlszcj + βc ∗Dc + βj ∗Dj + zcj (1)
The dependent variable, JQ, is one of the measures of job quantity or quality, described in
Section 2. When it is a continuous variable corresponding to total employment, the employ-
ment share by contract and worker type, the share of unpaid work, and the average training
intensity and wage by worker type, equation 1 is a linear model estimated by OLS. When
it is a dummy variable indicating that the firm offers temporary, part-time, or unpaid work,
equation 1 becomes a probit model. All non-dummy variables for job quantity and quality
are in logs except for those which represent non-monetary shares. The key variable of interest
is the dummy indicating that the firm is foreign-owned, foreignzcj . Its coefficient estimate,
β1, captures the relationship of job quantity and job quality with foreign ownership, or equiv-
alently, the quantity and quality of jobs offered by foreign-owned relative to domestic firms.
Moreover, country dummies, Dc, capture various location-specific factors such as institutional
quality, human capital of labour force, agglomeration of business activity, and infrastructure.
Industry dummies, Dj , capture industry-specific factors such as technology and knowledge
intensity.
We include a set of variables capturing essential firm-level characteristics in controlszcj .
The skill intensity of the firm’s workforce accounts for observable and unobservable worker
characteristics. Hence, it may be positively associated with training expenditure and wages
(Javorcik, 2015). By the same token, the dummy indicating whether the firm provides train-
ing to its employees may be associated with higher wages. A larger firm in terms of total
sales and number of affiliated establishments is likely to have higher employment levels, train-
ing expenditure, and wages. Based on evidence for size, productivity and wage premia of
exporters over non-exporters (Bernard et al., 2007), importers over non-importers (Bernard
et al., 2007), and MNEs over non-MNEs (Helpman et al., 2004), the levels of employment,
training expenditure and wages may also be positively associated with labour productivity,
input intensity, and the dummies indicating the engagement of the firm in exporting and in
backward and forward linkages. However, on condition that sourced material inputs substi-
tute for certain types of workers, input intensity and the dummies for engagement of the firm
in local and foreign backward linkages will be associated with lower quantity and quality of
jobs offered to these workers.
In addition, the three dummies for the main source of competition that a firm faces
can be positively or negatively associated with job quantity and job quality, depending on
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whether a firm offers jobs of higher or lower quantity and quality due to import competition
and competition from domestic firms and foreign-owned firms in the country. As the three
dummies are mutually exclusive, we choose as reference variable the dummy for competition
from foreign-owned firms based in the country and exclude it from all regressions. Hence,
the coefficient estimates of the two non-excluded dummies capture the job quantity and job
quality in firms facing competition mostly from imports and from domestic firms relative to
firms facing competition mostly from foreign-owned firms in the country.
Lucas (1978) and Hamermesh (1980) conjecture that physical capital and the skills of
workers complement each other (i.e., capital-skill complementarity hypothesis). Capital in-
tensity may hence be associated with higher training expenditure and wages. Firm age – as
a proxy for firm growth and survival – may be associated with higher levels of employment.
In addition, it may be associated with higher wages, as an indication of good human resource
practices of the firm (Brown and Medoff, 1989; Strobl and Thornton, 2004). However, firm
age may also be associated with lower employment and wages if firm entry and exit are rare.
For instance, Poschke (2013a) and Poschke (2013b) argue that there are firms, mostly in de-
veloping countries, which do not grow and nevertheless remain active in the market for years
(“entrepreneurs out of necessity”). All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except
for skill intensity and firm age.
In order to account for additional characteristics of foreign-owned firms, we also estimate
equation 1 after replacing the foreign ownership dummy with dummies indicating that the
parent companies of foreign-owned firms are located in high-income and low/middle-income
countries inside and outside Sub-Saharan Africa. In additional estimations of equation 1, we
replace the dummy for foreign ownership with a dummy indicating that the firm was created
as greenfield FDI, a dummy indicating that the firm is a majority-owned foreign affiliate
(MOFA), and dummies indicating the main business purpose of the firm.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Employment
We start the econometric analysis by identifying the relationship of foreign ownership with
total employment, permanent full-time, temporary, and part-time employment, as well as with
unpaid work. The negative and highly significant coefficient estimate of the dummy for foreign
ownership in column 1 of Table 5 indicates that total employment in foreign-owned firms is 10%
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lower than in domestic firms.9 Its negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate in
columns 3 and 4 also indicates that foreign-owned firms have a lower probability of employing
temporary workers by 7% and if they do so, they have a lower share of these workers in total
employment by 4 percentage points. In addition, foreign-owned firms have a 4 percentage
points higher share of permanent full-time employment in total employment, as indicated by
the relevant positive and significant coefficient estimate in column 2. In short, columns 1–4
reveal that foreign-owned firms tend to offer more stable and secure jobs than domestic firms.
The coefficient estimate of the foreign ownership dummy in columns 5 and 6 is positive but
statistically insignificant at all conventional levels. Hence, there are no statistically significant
differences between foreign-owned and domestic firms in their likelihood of employing part-
time workers and in their share of part-time employment in total employment. The negative
and significant coefficient estimates in columns 7 and 8 indicate that foreign-owned firms
have a 6% lower probability of offering unpaid work and a 0.7 percentage points lower share
of unpaid work in total salaried and non-salaried employment than domestic firms. Hence,
foreign-owned firms rely less on unpaid work than domestic firms.
<< Table 5 about here >>
Empirical evidence on the association of foreign ownership with non-wage working condi-
tions is very scarce (OECD and ILO, 2008). Almond and Ferner (2006) find that US MNEs
with affiliates in Europe tend to adapt to the conditions and labour practices of the host
countries rather than to transplant their own human resource practices into their foreign affil-
iates. Bloom et al. (2009) use a sample of US MNEs with affiliates in the UK, Germany, and
France and show that these firms transplant their management practices into their affiliates,
but not their human resource practices. Also, Freeman et al. (2008) examine a single US MNE
with domestic and foreign affiliates and find that its foreign affiliates adopt human resource
practices which are closer to those in the host countries where they are located.
With respect to the literature, our evidence on the advantage of foreign-owned firms in
job stability and security and their lower dependence on unpaid work may suggest that MNEs
have better human resources practices which they in turn transplant, at least partially, into
their foreign affiliates in Sub-Saharan Africa. One possible explanation for doing so is that
MNEs want to ensure that their foreign affiliates are able to run critical operations, such as
the production of intermediate and final output and the service of local and foreign markets,
9Since the dependent variable is in logs, the 10% lower total employment of foreign-owned firms with respect
to domestic ones is the log approximation. Taking exponents of the coefficient of the foreign ownership dummy,
we find that foreign-owned firms have lower total employment by 10.52% (100 ∗ (exp(0.10) − 1) = 10.52%).
13
according to the headquarters’ demands. Another possible explanation is that MNEs place a
high value on corporate social responsibility (OECD and ILO, 2008) and on their adherence
to international MNE standards in workplace practices such as the MNE Declaration,10 in
order to protect their reputation.
In Panel A of Table 6, we re-estimate the regressions after replacing the dummy for
foreign ownership with dummies corresponding to foreign-owned firms whose parents are lo-
cated in high-income and low/middle-income countries inside and outside Sub-Saharan Africa.
Foreign-owned firms whose parents are located in low/middle-income countries inside and
outside Sub-Saharan Africa have lower total employment and a lower share of temporary
employment (columns 1 and 4, respectively), while they have a higher share of permanent
full-time employment (column 2). Also, foreign-owned firms whose parents are located in
high-income countries have a lower probability of employing temporary workers (column 3).
In addition, foreign-owned firms whose parents are located outside Sub-Saharan Africa have a
lower probability of offering unpaid work (column 7), while those with parents in high-income
countries have a lower share of unpaid work in total salaried and non-salaried employment
(column 8).11
<< Table 6 about here >>
In Panel B, the dummies for greenfield FDI, MOFA status, and the main business purpose
of the firm are the main explanatory variables. Although foreign-owned firms whose main
business purpose is to export back to the home country have lower total employment than
domestic firms (column 1), they also have a higher share of permanent full-time employment
(column 2). In addition, this type of firms and those whose main business purpose is to
collaborate with a local partner are less likely to employ temporary workers and if they do
so, they employ a lower share of these workers (columns 3 and 4, respectively). Foreign-
owned firms whose main business purpose is to access new markets also have a lower share
of temporary workers (column 4). These findings suggest that the service of the home and
foreign markets by foreign affiliates and the creation of partnerships in the host country are
crucial business activities which require the creation of more stable and secure jobs within
these entities.
10The MNE Declaration refers to the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enter-
prises and Social Policy and was adopted by the constituents of the International Labour Organization in
2006. It provides guidance to enterprises on social policy and inclusive, responsible and sustainable workplace
practices (ILO, 2006).
11By and large, the results also hold when solely China, as well as when both China and India are excluded
from the group of low/middle-income countries outside Sub-Saharan Africa (Tables B1 and B2).
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By contrast, MOFAs employ a higher share of temporary workers than non-MOFAs and
domestic firms (column 4). Moreover, foreign-owned firms whose main business purpose is to
collaborate with a local partner are more likely to employ part-time workers and on condition
that they do so, they employ a higher share of these workers (columns 5 and 6, respectively).
Instead, MOFAs are less likely to employ part-time workers (column 5). Finally, from the
coefficient estimates of all main regressors in columns 7 and 8 we conclude that there are no
statistically significant associations of greenfield FDI, MOFA status, and the main business
purpose of the firm with the probability that it offers unpaid work and its share of unpaid
work in total salaried and non-salaried employment.
In Table 7, we study the potential role of firing costs and governance quality in the as-
sociation of foreign ownership with employment by contract type and unpaid work. To this
purpose, in Panel A and Panel B we re-estimate the regressions of Table 5 after incorpo-
rating an interaction term between the dummy for foreign ownership and the country-level
measure of firing costs and of governance quality, respectively. We do not incorporate in any
of the regressions in the two panels the corresponding country-level variable individually as
it is captured by the country dummies. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term in
column 1 of Panel A indicates that the lower total employment of foreign-owned firms relative
to domestic firms increases with higher firing costs. Columns 2–4 reveal that their higher
share of permanent full-time employment decreases with higher firing costs, while their lower
probability and share of temporary employment increase. According to columns 2 and 4 of
Panel B, the higher share of permanent full-time employment decreases and the lower share
of temporary employment increases with higher governance quality as well.
Higher firing costs imply higher employment protection and better bargaining terms of
workers vis-a`-vis their employers, while higher governance quality implies a higher overall
institutional quality in the country. Therefore, the gap in the stability and security of jobs
between foreign-owned and domestic firms in these countries is smaller because domestic firms
are likely to be induced to offer more stable and secure jobs than in countries with lower firing
costs and lower governance quality. The insignificant coefficient estimate of the interaction
term in columns 7 and 8 of both panels indicates that firings costs and governance quality
do not play a role in the association of the foreign ownership status of the firm with unpaid
work.
<< Table 7 about here >>
In Table 8, we study the association of foreign ownership with the shares of permanent
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full-time production, non-production, and managerial workers in total permanent full-time
employment.12 Foreign-owned firms have a higher share of production workers (column 1)
and a lower share of non-production workers (column 2). By contrast, there are no statistically
significant differences between foreign-owned and domestic firms in their share of managerial
workers (column 3).13
<< Table 8 about here >>
We also study the association of foreign ownership with permanent full-time female and
foreign employment. As shown in columns 1–4 of Table 9, there are no statistically significant
differences between foreign-owned and domestic firms in the shares of total female employment
and of female production, non-production, and managerial workers. Columns 5–8 indicate that
foreign-owned firms have higher shares of total foreign employment and of foreign production,
non-production, and managerial workers. These higher shares could be viewed as transfer of
critical human capital to foreign affiliates from other parts of the MNE such as the parent
company or a sister affiliate (Moran, 2007; Coniglio et al., 2016).14
<< Table 9 about here >>
4.2 Training
As shown in Table 10, foreign-owned firms invest more in training of their employees. In
particular, they have a ratio of total expenditure in training to total permanent full-time
employment that is higher by 52.9% (column 1). By accounting for worker heterogeneity, we
document that they also have a ratio of expenditure in training of managerial workers to the
total number of these workers that is higher by 56.8% (column 4).15 According to columns
12In column 3, we drop skill intensity from the regression since it is defined as the share of managers in total
permanent full-time employment, which in this case, happens to be the dependent variable.
13We re-estimate these regressions after incorporating the interaction term between the dummy for foreign
ownership and the country-level measure of firing costs. We do not include the country-level variable in the
regressions individually as it is captured by the country dummies. The statistically insignificant coefficient
estimate of the interaction term in all columns suggests that firing costs do not play a role in the association of
foreign ownership with the shares of permanent full-time production, non-production, and managerial workers
(Table B3).
14Coniglio et al. (2016) show that the share of foreign workers in foreign-owned firms is negatively associated
with the economic and institutional distance between the home and host countries, while it is positively
associated with their geographical distance. It is also positively associated with foreign-owned firms’ knowledge
intensity and negatively associated with their engagement in local linkages and their local market orientation.
15Taking exponents of the coefficient of the foreign ownership dummy, we find that foreign-owned firms have
a higher average training intensity by 69.72% (100 ∗ (exp(0.529)− 1) = 69.72%) and a higher training intensity
for managerial workers by 76.47% (100 ∗ (exp(0.568) − 1) = 76.47%).
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2 and 3, there are no statistically significant differences between foreign-owned and domestic
firms in terms of training intensity for production and non-production workers.
<< Table 10 about here >>
The findings in Table 10 are in line with many studies which report that foreign-owned
firms provide more training to their employees as compared to domestic firms. ILO (1981)
and Lindsey (1994) emphasise the substantial efforts undertaken by MNEs in the education
of local workers. Chen (1983) argues that the main benefit of Hong Kong manufacturing
from the presence of foreign-owned firms is mostly the training of workers at various levels,
rather than the production of new techniques and products. Similarly, Gershenberg (1987)
argues that MNEs offer more training to technical workers and managers than local firms do.
Also, Filer et al. (1995), World Bank (1997), and Barthel et al. (2011) show that foreign-
owned firms in Czech Republic, Malaysia, and Ghana, respectively, provide more training
to their workers. According to Blomstro¨m and Kokko (1998), provision of training to the
foreign affiliate’s employees –from on-the-job training, seminars and more formal schooling to
overseas education– is a form of technology and knowledge transfer from the parent which
may be crucial for the business operations of the MNE as a whole. As foreign-owned firms
tend to offer more opportunities for training and personal development of their staff than
domestic firms, workers themselves may find it more attractive and rewarding to be employed
by the first type of firms (Javorcik, 2015).
4.3 Wages
Table 11 shows the relationship of foreign ownership with the average wage, as well as with
the wage paid to permanent full-time production, non-production, and managerial workers.
Foreign-owned firms pay an average wage that is 31.9% higher than the average wage paid by
domestic firms (column 1), as well as wages to non-production and managerial workers that
are higher by 25.4% and 32%, respectively (columns 3 and 4).16,17
<< Table 11 about here >>
16Taking exponents of the coefficient of the foreign ownership dummy, we find that foreign-owned firms pay
an average wage premium of 37.58% (100 ∗ (exp(0.319) − 1) = 37.58%), a wage premium to non-production
workers of 28.92% (100 ∗ (exp(0.254) − 1) = 28.92%), and a wage premium to managerial workers of 37.71%
(100 ∗ (exp(0.320) − 1) = 37.71%).
17When we drop from the sample all domestic firms which are not multinationals and therefore, compare the
wages paid by foreign and domestic MNEs, we find no statistically significant differences in the average wage
and in the wages paid to production and managerial workers (Table B4). We only find that non-production
workers are paid a wage premium by foreign MNEs.
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These findings are in line with several studies which report wage premia of foreign-owned
firms (te Velde and Morrissey, 2003; Strobl and Thornton, 2004; Lipsey and Sjo¨holm, 2004;
Sjo¨holm and Lipsey, 2006; Coniglio et al., 2015). The extant literature has also provided
several possible explanations for their existence (Javorcik, 2015).
One explanation is related to labour mobility across firms which involves the spread of
information (Arrow, 1962).18 The wage premium acts as a disincentive for cross-firm labour
mobility and ultimately prevents the ensuing knowledge diffusion from happening (Fosfuri
et al., 2001; Glass and Saggi, 2002; Balsvik, 2011; Poole, 2013).19 The risk of knowledge
diffusion through labour mobility is particularly high for MNEs because of their investment
in personnel training (Blomstro¨m and Kokko, 1998)20 and the significant R&D efforts made by
foreign affiliates (Fairchild and Sosin, 1986). Through these processes, their workers acquire
critical knowledge that can later spill over if they decide to work for a domestic employer or
set up their own rival firm, without compensating their former employers for the full inventory
of ideas that travels with them.
The wage premium may also be explained by rent-sharing across international borders
(Budd and Slaughter, 2004) and rent-sharing arrangements between MNEs – as highly pro-
ductive and profitable firms – and their employees (Budd et al., 2005). In addition, it may be
a form of compensation for the higher labour demand volatility in foreign plants (Fabbri et al.,
2003; Javorcik, 2015) or for the higher foreign plant closure rate (Javorcik, 2015). Lipsey and
Sjo¨holm (2004) rationalise the wage premium as a way for foreign-owned firms to offset their
lack of knowledge of the local labour market in order to succeed in identifying and attracting
the good workers of the country. It may also be attributed to “cherry-picking”. That is, to
domestic firms with above-average human capital and wages which are taken over by foreign
investors through mergers and acquisitions (Almeida, 2007). Furthermore, the wage premium
may arise because of unobservable worker characteristics such as higher ability or greater mo-
tivation (Javorcik, 2015), as well as because foreign-owned firms tend to operate in high-wage
sectors and locations (Moran, 2007). Finally, according to the labour market literature, the
18For a survey of the empirical literature on labour mobility across firms and knowledge spillovers, see Go¨rg
and Greenaway (2004).
19If patents or other intellectual property rights could perfectly protect knowledge and ideas from being
expropriated, labour mobility would not have been a concern for entrepreneurs. Except for the wage premium
as a disincentive for labour mobility across firms, firm owners design special labour contracts and incentive pay
programmes for their employees such as profit-sharing agreements and long-term stock options (Balkin and
Gomez-Mejia, 1985; Møen, 2005).
20UNLTC (1993) reports that knowledgeable foreign workers employed by foreign-owned firms are gradually
replaced by local workers who have been trained by them in the meanwhile. In addition, Møen (2005) finds
that technical employees in R&D-intensive firms pay for the human capital that they develop by accepting
lower wages early in their career. They are later paid higher wages as a compensation for their investment in
human capital at earlier stages.
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wage premium may result from the more sophisticated human resource practices adopted by
MNEs (Javorcik, 2015).
In Panel A of Table 12, we re-estimate the benchmark wage regressions with dummies
for the parent location as the main explanatory variables. In Panel B, the main explanatory
variables are the dummies for greenfield FDI, MOFA status and the main business purpose
of the firm. According to Panel A, the wage premium to non-production workers is paid
by foreign-owned firms whose parents are located inside and outside Sub-Saharan Africa
(column 3), while the average wage premium and the wage premium to managerial workers
are paid only by those firms whose parents are located in countries outside Sub-Saharan Africa
(columns 1 and 4, respectively). Interestingly, a wage premium to production workers, of
24.2%, is paid only by foreign-owned firms whose parents are located in high-income countries
(column 2).21
<< Table 12 about here >>
According to Panel B, foreign-owned firms whose main business purpose is to benefit from
a free trade agreement pay a higher average wage than domestic firms (column 1). Also, those
created as greenfield FDI pay a lower wage to managerial workers than domestic firms and
those which became foreign-owned through M&As (column 4). This may be explained by
the “cherry-picking” argument put forward by Almeida (2007). That is, the main target of
foreign investors for M&As is likely to be domestic firms which have higher productivity and
greater human capital than the average domestic firm and thus already pay a wage premium
to their managers.22
By contrast, foreign-owned firms whose main business purpose is to access new markets
or to export back to the home country pay higher wages to non-production and managerial
workers. These wage premia suggest that the role of these types of workers is crucial in
foreign-owned firms that aim at serving the home and new foreign markets through exports.
In particular, managers are likely to have an important supervisory role in the local production
of output and a key role in the communication between the parent company and the foreign
affiliate. For instance, Antra`s et al. (2008) show that the role of managers in foreign affiliates
which trade with their parent is crucial because it allows them to save on communication
costs. That is, managers deal with routine problems faced by local production workers that
21The results also hold when solely China, as well as when both China and India are excluded from the
group of low/middle countries outside Sub-Saharan Africa. The only exception is that a wage premium to
non-production workers is not paid by foreign-owned firms whose parents are located in low/middle-income
countries outside Sub-Saharan and other than China and India (Tables B5 and B6).
22See also Girma and Go¨rg (2007) and Heyman et al. (2007).
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top managers in the parent company should have otherwise addressed themselves. Foreign-
owned firms whose main business purpose is to join a specific partner in the host country pay
a lower wage to production workers. If this collaboration involves production-intensive tasks
being undertaken mostly in their local partner, then production workers may add lower value
to the production of output in these firms and thus receive a lower wage.
In Panel A of Table 13, we study the role of institutional quality in the association between
foreign ownership and the wage premium. We re-estimate the benchmark wage regressions
after incorporating the interaction term between the dummy for foreign ownership and the
overall index of governance quality (IIAG). The negative and significant coefficient estimate of
the interaction term in column 4 indicates that the wage gap for managerial workers between
foreign-owned and domestic firms is smaller in countries with higher governance quality. The
relevant coefficient estimate in the remaining columns is also negative, albeit statistically
insignificant.23 As higher governance quality may imply a more solid wage bargaining setting
and a better business regulatory environment, the wage premia for managers are lower in
these countries because domestic firms are likely to be induced to pay higher wages to them
than in countries with lower governance quality.
<< Table 13 about here >>
In additional regressions, we incorporate an interaction term between the dummy for for-
eign ownership and the social inclusion index. The estimation results in Panel B indicate
that the average wage premium, and the wage premia for production and managerial work-
ers between foreign-owned and domestic firms are smaller in countries with greater social
inclusion.24 As greater social inclusion implies higher social policy standards, one plausible
explanation for the lower wage premia is that domestic firms are induced to pay higher wages
in these countries than in countries with lower social policy standards.
23We obtain very similar results when we interact the dummy for foreign ownership with a variable capturing
the rule of law, which is one of the 14 sub-categories of the overall index of governance quality and is also
provided by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (Table B7). Same as the governance quality measure, it ranges
between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating stronger rule of law in the host country.
24The social protection measure serves as an alternative proxy for social policy standards in the host country.
Same as the social inclusion measure, it is a rating between 1 and 6 provided by the World Bank’s WDI. Its
higher values indicate higher social protection. From estimations where we interact the dummy for foreign
ownership with the social protection index, we find that the wage premium for managerial workers is lower in
countries with higher social protection (Table B8).
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5 Conclusion and policy implications
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the quantity and quality of jobs offered by
foreign-owned firms relative domestic ones. We also show how these differences are determined
by country-level institutional factors such as firing costs, governance quality, and social inclu-
sion. To this purpose, we use a sample of foreign-owned and domestic firms in 19 Sub-Saharan
African countries for the year 2009.
We document that foreign-owned firms tend to create jobs which offer higher stability
and security, more training opportunities and higher wages than domestic firms. Higher job
stability and security and higher wages are offered particularly by foreign-owned firms whose
main business purpose is to serve the home or foreign markets. Foreign-owned firms are also
less dependent on unpaid work. These findings may suggest that MNEs have better human
resource practices which they in turn transplant, at least partially, into their foreign affiliates.
Hence, their presence in Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be beneficial for local workers.
We also provide robust evidence for country-level institutional factors to play an essential
role in these differences between foreign-owned and domestic firms. In particular, the differ-
ences in job stability and security are smaller in countries with higher firing costs and higher
governance quality, while the wage differences are smaller in countries with higher governance
quality and higher social policy standards. The most plausible explanation for these findings
is that domestic firms in these countries offer more stable and secure and better paid jobs
than in countries with lower firings costs, governance quality and social policy standards. In
turn, the smaller job quality gap between foreign-owned and domestic firms in countries with
institutions of relatively high quality suggests that their local workers may benefit less from
the presence of foreign-owned firms as compared to workers in countries with institutions of
relatively low quality.
The main findings of this paper lead to new avenues for further research which may
generate new policy recommendations. Despite the advantage of foreign-owned firms relative
to domestic ones in terms of their human resource practices, we still have limited evidence on
whether parent companies of foreign MNEs transplant their better human resource practices
into their foreign affiliates and the extent to which this happens. Very little is also known
about whether such practices spill over from foreign-owned to domestic firms and the channels
through which these spillovers can occur. In addition, the possible reasons for which foreign-
owned firms adopt better human resource practices need to be examined thoroughly. One
reason could be that foreign-owned firms have a relatively large stock of knowledge and workers
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who have access to it are incentivised to be loyal to their employers. Another reason could be
that foreign-owned firms have a greater tendency to invest in education and skill development
of their employees and want to benefit from returns on their investment.
In this paper, we show that firing costs are an important policy tool inducing domestic
firms to reduce the gap in job stability and security relative to foreign-owned firms. Future
research could study whether other labour market policies (e.g. introduction of minimum
wage) can be as effective as firing costs or whether such labour market policies can act as
deterrent factors for foreign investment.
The positive association between foreign ownership and foreign employment shares gen-
erates a cascade of important questions that need to be thoroughly investigated. To what
extent do foreign workers interact with domestic ones and exchange knowledge with them
within foreign-owned firms? Are foreign workers gradually replaced by local workers after the
latter receive proper training and develop certain skills? Does knowledge exchange between
foreign and domestic workers produce positive local externalities, for instance, through cross-
firm labour mobility? These questions are of particular interest to policy makers because the
presence of foreign workers and the subsequent externalities may imply the creation of jobs
whose productivity is above the country average and the generation of significant productivity,
knowledge, and wage spillovers to domestic firms.
Moreover, our evidence on the relationship of foreign ownership with wage premia for
different types of workers calls for further research on the reasons for their existence which
will adequately account for worker heterogeneity and for foreign firm characteristics and ac-
tivities. The precise identification of these reasons is expected to be of high policy relevance.
Also, the precise identification of the mechanisms which explain the lower job stability and
security gap between foreign-owned and domestic firms in countries with higher firing costs
and institutional quality, as well as their lower wage gap in countries with higher institutional
quality and social policy standards is essential.
Finally, the causal relationship of foreign ownership with the quantity and quality of jobs
is a critical issue which cannot be addressed with the dataset used in this paper. Does foreign
ownership lead to more stable and secure employment, more training opportunities and higher
wages? Or domestic firms are taken over by foreign MNEs because they already offer more
stable and secure jobs, invest more in training and pay higher wages (i.e., cherry-picking)?
The answer to this question is important for the design of appropriate policies (Almeida,
2007). Hopefully, the increasing availability of matched employer-employee data will allow us
to address this question properly in the future.
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Tables with main descriptive statistics
Table 1: Domestic and foreign-owned firms by country and by sector
Panel A: Domestic and Foreign-Owned Firms by Country
Country Domestic Foreign Total
Name # % # % # %
Burkina Faso 94 76.4 29 23.6 123 100
Burundi 131 74 46 26 177 100
Cameroon 137 50.7 133 49.3 270 100
Cape Verde 286 73.3 104 26.7 390 100
Ethiopia 436 76.6 133 23.4 569 100
Ghana 240 56.9 182 43.1 422 100
Kenya 324 52.7 291 47.3 615 100
Lesotho 103 57.5 76 42.5 179 100
Madagascar 109 47 123 53 232 100
Malawi 81 62.8 48 37.2 129 100
Mali 207 69.5 91 30.5 298 100
Mozambique 191 59.5 130 40.5 321 100
Niger 83 79 22 21 105 100
Nigeria 447 75 149 25 596 100
Rwanda 116 61.4 73 38.6 189 100
Senegal 181 62.2 110 37.8 291 100
Tanzania 304 66.2 155 33.8 459 100
Uganda 407 50.1 406 49.9 813 100
Zambia 217 68 102 32 319 100
Total 4094 63 2403 37 6497 100
Panel B: Domestic and Foreign-Owned Firms by Sector
Sector Domestic Foreign Total
Name # % # % # %
Agriculture 108 48.6 114 51.4 222 100
Mining 35 40.2 52 59.8 87 100
Manufacturing 2000 63.4 1153 36.6 3153 100
EGW and Construction 304 67.7 145 32.3 449 100
Services 1647 63.7 938 36.3 2585 100
Total 4094 63 2402 37 6496 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Sectors defined on the basis of the ISIC Rev. 1.1.
Agriculture (1–5); Mining (10–14); Manufacturing (15–39); Electricity, Gas and Water
Supply and Construction (40 and 45); Services (50–99).
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table 2: Statistics for dummy variables
Dummy variable No Yes Missing Total
# % # % # % # %
foreign ownership 4094 63 2403 37 0 0 6497 100
parent in high-income (HI) country 1132 47.1 1136 47.3 135 5.6 2403 100
parent in low/middle-income (LMI) country 1448 60.3 822 34.2 133 5.5 2403 100
parent in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 1961 81.6 312 13 130 5.4 2403 100
greenfield FDI 364 15.1 1965 81.8 74 3.1 2403 100
majority-owned foreign affiliate (MOFA) 291 12.1 2046 85.1 66 2.7 2403 100
principal motive to invest: market access 587 24.4 1697 70.6 119 5 2403 100
principal motive to invest: low cost 2135 88.8 149 6.2 119 5 2403 100
principal motive to invest: input access 2164 90.1 120 5 119 5 2403 100
principal motive to invest: join partner 2170 90.3 114 4.7 119 5 2403 100
principal motive to invest: export back home 2227 92.7 57 2.4 119 5 2403 100
principal motive to invest: TA benefits 2233 92.9 51 2.1 119 5 2403 100
principal motive to invest: other 2188 91.1 96 4 119 5 2403 100
temporary employment 2911 44.8 3586 55.2 0 0 6497 100
part-time employment 5460 84 1037 16 0 0 6497 100
unpaid work 5470 84.2 558 8.6 469 7.2 6497 100
training 3340 51.4 3148 48.5 9 0.1 6497 100
local backward linkages 1773 27.3 4638 71.4 86 1.3 6497 100
foreign backward linkages 580 8.9 3839 59.1 2078 32 6497 100
local forward linkages 3113 47.9 3384 52.1 0 0 6497 100
export status 4387 67.5 1536 23.6 574 8.8 6497 100
import competition 5055 77.8 1104 17 338 5.2 6497 100
local competition (from domestic firms) 2556 39.3 3603 55.5 338 5.2 6497 100
local competition (from foreign-owned firms) 4707 72.4 1452 22.3 338 5.2 6497 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Each dummy is equal to 1 if the corresponding statement is valid, and 0 otherwise. For a detailed
description of the variables, see Table 14.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table 3: Summary statistics for non-dummy variables
N Mean Sd Min Max
total employment 6400 184 643 1 17601
permanent full-time employment (share) 6388 0.80 0.25 0 1
temporary employment (share) 6306 0.17 0.23 0 1
part-time employment (share) 6276 0.03 0.09 0 1
unpaid work (share) 6005 0.01 0.05 0 1
permanent full-time production workers (share) 6398 0.49 0.32 0 1
permanent full-time non-production workers (share) 6398 0.25 0.25 0 1
permanent full-time managerial workers (share) 6222 0.23 0.21 0 1
permanent full-time female workers (share) 6186 0.26 0.22 0 1
permanent full-time female production workers (share) 5221 0.19 0.26 0 1
permanent full-time female non-production workers (share) 5750 0.41 0.31 0 1
permanent full-time female managerial workers (share) 5659 0.21 0.25 0 1
permanent full-time foreign workers (share) 5777 0.05 0.10 0 1
permanent full-time foreign production workers (share) 5232 0.02 0.08 0 1
permanent full-time foreign non-production workers (share) 5782 0.05 0.16 0 1
permanent full-time foreign managerial workers (share) 5397 0.15 0.27 0 1
average training intensity (USD) 5907 6.4 65.5 0 2657
training intensity for production workers (USD) 5120 3.3 49.2 0 2246
training intensity for non-production workers (USD) 5644 6.5 88.6 0 4549
training intensity for managerial workers (USD) 5717 16.3 278.7 0 18954
average wage (thousand USD) 5830 1.4 74.3 0 5569
wage for production workers (USD) 5730 29.6 419.4 0 14992
wage for non-production workers (USD) 5822 39.4 383.3 0 18960
wage for managerial workers (USD) 5788 57.3 537.7 0 25169
sales (million USD) 6075 1 35 0 2567
productivity (thousand USD) 6046 20 985 0 75503
skill intensity 6222 0.23 0.21 0 1
capital intensity (thousand USD) 5994 11 597 0 45529
input intensity (thousand USD) 5665 6 124 0 7131
firm age (years) 6419 18 15 1 163
affiliated parties 4850 9 126 1 6101
Notes: Authors’ calculations. For a detailed description of the variables, see Table 14.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table 4: Firing costs, governance quality and social inclusion in 2009 by country
Country Firing costs Governance quality Social inclusion
Burkina Faso 34 53.3 3.6
Burundi 26 45.8 3.3
Cameroon 33 46.8 3.1
Cape Verde 93 75.2 4.3
Ethiopia 40 44.3 3.6
Ghana 178 67.2 3.9
Kenya 47 53 3.5
Lesotho 44 58.3 3.3
Madagascar 30 50.9 3.6
Malawi 84 56.5 3.5
Mali 31 55.6 3.4
Mozambique 134 54.8 3.3
Niger 35 43 3.1
Nigeria 50 44.7 3.2
Rwanda 26 56.2 3.9
Senegal 38 58 3.4
Tanzania 18 58.8 3.7
Uganda 13 54.3 3.8
Zambia 178 56.7 3.5
Sample mean 59.6 54.4 3.5
Notes: Firing costs are measured as the number of weeks a worker is paid after she is laid
off. The overall index of governance quality ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 is the
best possible score within the group of 54 African countries between 2000 and the latest
data year. The social inclusion measure is a rating between 1 and 6, with higher values
indicating higher social inclusion. The data correspond to the year 2009.
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators (firing costs, social inclusion) and
Mo Ibrahim Foundation (governance quality).
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Tables with main results
Table 5: Employment by contract type, unpaid work and foreign ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var: total permanent temporary temporary part-time part-time unpaid unpaid
employment employment employment employment employment employment work work
(share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
foreign -0.10*** 0.04** -0.07* -0.04*** 0.003 0.005 -0.06*** -0.007*
[0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.02] [0.03] [0.006] [0.02] [0.004]
sales 0.9*** 0.04*** 0.007 -0.03*** 0.02** -0.003 -0.003 -0.004***
[0.01] [0.005] [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.002] [0.006] [0.001]
productivity -0.9*** -0.05*** 0.005 0.05*** -0.03*** 0.002 0.001 0.004***
[0.02] [0.007] [0.01] [0.006] [0.010] [0.003] [0.008] [0.002]
skill intensity 0.3*** -0.1*** 0.1* 0.1*** 0.07 0.003 -0.04 0.006
[0.08] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.01] [0.04] [0.01]
wage 0.04*** -0.005 0.0008 0.007 -0.010 -0.002 -0.007 -0.002*
[0.01] [0.005] [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.002] [0.006] [0.001]
training -0.02 0.01 0.001 -0.02** 0.02 0.004 0.03** 0.003
[0.02] [0.010] [0.02] [0.009] [0.02] [0.004] [0.01] [0.002]
capital intensity 0.02*** -0.008** 0.01** 0.008** 0.01*** 0.0005 0.002 -0.0009
[0.008] [0.003] [0.007] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.0007]
input intensity 0.009 -0.005 -0.00009 0.005 -0.007 0.0009 0.0008 0.00007
[0.009] [0.004] [0.008] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.0005]
firm age 0.0002 0.00004 0.0002 -0.00005 0.0002 0.00003 -0.00004 0.00003
[0.0006] [0.0003] [0.0006] [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0001] [0.0004] [0.00005]
affiliated parties -0.003 -0.007 0.03** 0.009 0.01 -0.002 0.004 0.002
[0.01] [0.007] [0.01] [0.006] [0.01] [0.002] [0.009] [0.002]
local backward link 0.03 -0.02* 0.09*** 0.03** -0.005 -0.01 -0.003 0.002
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.006] [0.02] [0.002]
foreign backward link 0.02 -0.02 0.08*** 0.02 0.02 -0.005 -0.009 0.0002
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.006] [0.02] [0.003]
local forward link 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.002 0.06*** 0.02*** -0.01 -0.00007
[0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.004] [0.02] [0.002]
export status 0.1*** -0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.006 -0.004 0.008 0.003
[0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.004] [0.02] [0.003]
import competition -0.007 0.008 0.03 -0.01 0.003 0.005 0.01 -0.002
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.005] [0.02] [0.003]
local competition 0.003 -0.006 0.03 0.0008 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.002
[0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.004] [0.02] [0.003]
Obs 2517 2517 2514 2510 2512 2502 2354 2446
R2 0.88 0.23 0.23 0.040 0.046
Pseudo−R2 0.13 0.092 0.094
Log − likelihood -1453.6 -1008.9 -678.8
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in columns 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8. Probit estimations with country and industry dummies in columns 3, 5 and 7.
Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill intensity and firm age. All non-dummy
dependent variables are also in logs except for those which represent non-monetary shares. The coefficient estimates in columns 3, 5 and 7 represent marginal effects. For the
description of the variables, see Table 14.
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Table 6: Employment by contract type, unpaid work and additional characteristics of foreign-
owned firms
Panel A: Parent location
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var: total permanent temporary temporary part-time part-time unpaid unpaid
employment employment employment employment employment employment work work
(share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
parent HI -0.08 0.02 -0.10** -0.03 -0.02 0.004 -0.06* -0.009**
[0.05] [0.02] [0.05] [0.02] [0.04] [0.007] [0.03] [0.004]
parent LMI -0.10** 0.05** -0.06 -0.05*** 0.05 0.008 -0.06* -0.005
[0.04] [0.02] [0.05] [0.02] [0.04] [0.008] [0.03] [0.004]
parent SSA -0.1** 0.07** -0.06 -0.08** -0.01 0.0007 -0.09 -0.004
[0.06] [0.03] [0.07] [0.03] [0.05] [0.01] [0.06] [0.004]
Obs 2513 2513 2510 2506 2508 2498 2350 2442
R2 0.88 0.23 0.23 0.040 0.046
Pseudo−R2 0.13 0.093 0.094
Log − likelihood -1451.0 -1006.3 -678.3
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentLMI
(P-value) 0.71 0.28 0.50 0.23 0.098 0.67 0.95 0.20
F-test H0:
βparentLMI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.32 0.14 0.66 0.13 0.87 0.79 0.61 0.17
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.47 0.50 0.93 0.54 0.24 0.58 0.65 0.72
Panel B: greenfield FDI, MOFA status, principal motive for foreign investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var: total permanent temporary temporary part-time part-time unpaid unpaid
employment employment employment employment employment employment work work
(share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
greenfield FDI -0.09 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.005 -0.01 -0.05 -0.003
[0.05] [0.03] [0.07] [0.03] [0.05] [0.01] [0.04] [0.003]
MOFA 0.06 -0.04 0.1 0.07* -0.1* -0.03 -0.05 -0.006
[0.09] [0.05] [0.1] [0.04] [0.07] [0.02] [0.06] [0.004]
market access -0.08 0.05 -0.1 -0.09** 0.08 0.03 0.010 0.002
[0.09] [0.05] [0.1] [0.04] [0.08] [0.03] [0.07] [0.006]
low cost 0.04 0.008 -0.1 -0.03 0.1 0.02 0.03 0.003
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.06] [0.1] [0.03] [0.1] [0.008]
input access 0.2 -0.07 0.1 -0.005 0.1 0.07 0.08 0.005
[0.2] [0.08] [0.1] [0.06] [0.10] [0.05] [0.08] [0.006]
join partner -0.1 0.05 -0.3* -0.1* 0.3** 0.06** 0.09 0.003
[0.2] [0.08] [0.2] [0.06] [0.1] [0.03] [0.10] [0.007]
export back home -0.2* 0.2** -0.5*** -0.2*** 0.10 0.07 0.1 -0.01
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.06] [0.2] [0.06] [0.1] [0.009]
TA benefits 0.1 -0.010 -0.03 -0.03 0.2 0.04 0.1 -0.008
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.05] [0.2] [0.03] [0.1] [0.01]
other motive -0.05 0.09 -0.3* -0.1* 0.03 0.1 0.004
[0.1] [0.07] [0.2] [0.07] [0.03] [0.10] [0.009]
Obs 2619 2619 2616 2612 2589 2604 2442 2545
R2 0.88 0.22 0.22 0.041 0.051
Pseudo−R2 0.13 0.096 0.097
Log − likelihood -1513.1 -1037.9 -718.4
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in columns 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8 of both panels. Probit estimations with country and industry dummies in columns 3, 5
and 7 of both panels. Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill intensity and firm age. All
non-dummy dependent variables are also in logs except for those which represent non-monetary shares. The coefficient estimates in columns 3, 5 and 7 of both panels represent
marginal effects. The regressions include all the control variables listed in Table 5 but their coefficient estimates are not reported for the sake of brevity. For the description of all
variables, see Table 14.
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Table 7: Employment by contract type, unpaid work and foreign ownership (firing costs and
governance quality)
Panel A: Firing costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var: total permanent temporary temporary part-time part-time unpaid unpaid
employment employment employment employment employment employment work work
(share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
foreign -0.2*** 0.09*** -0.2*** -0.09*** -0.010 -0.002 -0.05 -0.006
[0.05] [0.02] [0.05] [0.02] [0.04] [0.008] [0.03] [0.004]
foreign * firing cost 0.002*** -0.0010*** 0.001*** 0.0008*** 0.0002 0.0001* -0.0003 -0.00002
[0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0004] [0.00007] [0.0005] [0.00003]
Obs 2517 2517 2514 2510 2512 2502 2354 2446
R2 0.88 0.23 0.23 0.041 0.046
Pseudo−R2 0.13 0.092 0.094
Log − likelihood -1450.3 -1008.8 -678.7
Panel B: Governance quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var: total permanent temporary temporary part-time part-time unpaid unpaid
employment employment employment employment employment employment work work
(share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
foreign -0.4** 0.2** -0.4* -0.3*** 0.2 0.04 0.09 0.003
[0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.1] [0.2] [0.03] [0.2] [0.01]
foreign * governance 0.006 -0.004* 0.005 0.004** -0.003 -0.0006 -0.003 -0.0002
[0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.0006] [0.003] [0.0002]
Obs 2517 2517 2514 2510 2512 2502 2354 2446
R2 0.88 0.23 0.23 0.040 0.046
Pseudo−R2 0.13 0.093 0.094
Log − likelihood -1452.5 -1008.3 -678.2
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in columns 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8. Probit estimations with country and industry dummies in columns 3, 5 and 7.
Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill intensity and firm age. All non-dummy
dependent variables are also in logs except for those which represent non-monetary shares. The coefficient estimates in columns 3, 5 and 7 represent marginal effects. The
regressions include all the control variables listed in Table 5 but their coefficient estimates are not reported for the sake of brevity. For the description of all variables, see
Table 14.
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Table 8: Permanent full-time employment and foreign ownership
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var: permanent full-time workers (share)
production non-production managerial
foreign 0.03** -0.03** -0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
sales 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
productivity -0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
skill intensity -0.8*** -0.1***
[0.03] [0.03]
wage -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
training -0.02*** 0.02** 0.02***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006]
capital intensity -0.001 0.002 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
input intensity -0.002 0.002 0.0003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
firm age -0.0007*** 0.0006** 0.0002
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
affiliated parties -0.01** 0.01* 0.005
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
local backward link 0.02 -0.02 -0.005
[0.01] [0.01] [0.010]
foreign backward link -0.03*** 0.02** 0.002
[0.01] [0.01] [0.010]
local forward link 0.01 -0.01 -0.002
[0.01] [0.01] [0.009]
export status 0.005 -0.01 -0.003
[0.010] [0.009] [0.008]
import competition -0.02 0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.010]
local competition -0.01 0.01 0.004
[0.01] [0.01] [0.008]
Obs 2517 2517 2517
R2 0.59 0.37 0.16
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns. Dummies
take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables
are in logs except for skill intensity and firm age. The dependent variables are not in logs.
Skill intensity is dropped from the regression in column 3. For the description of the
variables, see Table 14.
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Table 9: Permanent full-time female and foreign employment and foreign ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var: permanent full-time female workers (share) permanent full-time foreign workers (share)
all production non-production managerial all production non-production managerial
foreign -0.02 -0.01 -0.009 -0.03 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.2***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.009] [0.009] [0.02] [0.02]
sales -0.003 0.010** -0.02*** 0.007 -0.003** 0.001 0.004 -0.002
[0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004]
productivity -0.002 -0.02*** 0.02** -0.006 0.005* -0.001 0.0003 0.01*
[0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.006]
skill intensity 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.0003 -0.02 -0.2***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.01] [0.010] [0.02] [0.03]
wage 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.0006 0.001 -0.0001 0.002 -0.000002
[0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004]
training 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.006
[0.008] [0.009] [0.01] [0.01] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.009]
capital intensity -0.004 -0.003 0.0008 -0.002 0.0008 0.00006 0.001 0.007**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]
input intensity -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.002* -0.001 0.003
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004]
firm age -0.0006*** -0.0005* -0.0007* -0.00010 -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0005*** -0.0007**
[0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.00009] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0003]
affiliated parties 0.01** 0.005 0.001 0.01* -0.002 -0.005* -0.006 -0.02**
[0.005] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.007]
local backward link -0.003 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.009 -0.004 -0.002 -0.02
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.01]
foreign backward link 0.02** 0.02* 0.008 0.009 0.01*** 0.007** 0.02*** 0.03***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.009]
local forward link -0.02 -0.009 -0.01 0.006 0.01*** 0.001 0.01** 0.03***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.01]
export status 0.03*** 0.04*** -0.007 0.008 0.006 0.0003 0.01 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.01]
import competition -0.01 -0.01 -0.05** 0.009 -0.01** -0.009* -0.002 -0.01
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.005] [0.005] [0.010] [0.01]
local competition -0.02** -0.02* -0.03 -0.009 -0.01*** -0.007 -0.006 -0.03**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.01]
Obs 2502 2310 2287 2349 2367 2316 2296 2239
R2 0.29 0.29 0.089 0.070 0.17 0.083 0.097 0.25
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables
are in logs except for skill intensity and firm age. The dependent variables are not in logs. For the description of the variables, see Table 14.
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Table 10: Provision of training and foreign ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: training intensity
average production non-production managerial
workers workers workers
foreign 0.529* 0.222 0.536 0.568*
[0.273] [0.349] [0.371] [0.335]
sales -0.314*** -0.447*** -0.277*** -0.192***
[0.055] [0.073] [0.075] [0.068]
productivity 0.467*** 0.715*** 0.300*** 0.275***
[0.083] [0.115] [0.112] [0.093]
skill intensity 0.791** 2.002*** 0.406 -2.358***
[0.373] [0.633] [0.550] [0.441]
wage 0.118* 0.089 0.095 0.172**
[0.062] [0.071] [0.081] [0.070]
capital intensity 0.214*** 0.166*** 0.190*** 0.163***
[0.042] [0.053] [0.060] [0.053]
input intensity -0.005 -0.038 0.048 -0.001
[0.046] [0.074] [0.057] [0.051]
firm age 0.002 0.010* -0.004 -0.003
[0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
affiliated parties -0.028 0.098 0.088 -0.021
[0.116] [0.131] [0.137] [0.138]
local backward link 0.299 0.109 0.152 0.038
[0.216] [0.384] [0.288] [0.290]
foreign backward link 0.190 -0.213 0.125 0.182
[0.188] [0.220] [0.291] [0.203]
local forward link 0.255 -0.038 0.317 0.439
[0.207] [0.318] [0.276] [0.271]
export status 0.078 -0.011 -0.041 -0.247
[0.162] [0.214] [0.249] [0.214]
import competition -0.066 0.154 -0.352 0.023
[0.194] [0.251] [0.308] [0.257]
local competition -0.016 0.093 -0.178 -0.105
[0.154] [0.218] [0.232] [0.181]
Obs 854 564 455 589
R2 0.64 0.65 0.59 0.63
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if
the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill
intensity and firm age. The dependent variables are in logs. For the description of the variables, see
Table 14.
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Table 11: Average wage and foreign ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: average wage for wage for wage for
wage production non-production managerial
workers workers workers
foreign 0.319*** 0.113 0.254*** 0.320***
[0.081] [0.074] [0.073] [0.078]
sales -0.036 0.040*** 0.107*** 0.104***
[0.022] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016]
productivity 0.317*** 0.039 0.010 0.019
[0.048] [0.024] [0.029] [0.027]
skill intensity 0.464*** 0.263* 0.141 -0.129
[0.151] [0.153] [0.129] [0.136]
training 0.088** 0.044 0.115*** 0.109***
[0.041] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034]
capital intensity 0.077*** 0.009 -0.012 0.007
[0.019] [0.011] [0.013] [0.013]
input intensity 0.064** 0.007 -0.003 0.017
[0.029] [0.015] [0.018] [0.017]
firm age 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
affiliated parties -0.015 0.051* -0.015 0.020
[0.034] [0.029] [0.025] [0.025]
local backward link 0.102* 0.076 -0.075 -0.000
[0.056] [0.049] [0.051] [0.049]
foreign backward link 0.112* 0.068 0.095** 0.044
[0.064] [0.046] [0.047] [0.045]
local forward link 0.037 0.020 0.069 0.045
[0.054] [0.051] [0.054] [0.050]
export status 0.034 0.105** 0.116** 0.021
[0.055] [0.049] [0.049] [0.048]
import competition -0.044 -0.050 -0.023 -0.082
[0.067] [0.053] [0.056] [0.055]
local competition -0.096* 0.050 -0.041 -0.034
[0.054] [0.049] [0.050] [0.048]
Obs 2517 2387 2364 2442
R2 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.90
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if
the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill
intensity and firm age. The dependent variables are in logs. For the description of the variables, see
Table 14.
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Table 12: Average wage and additional characteristics of foreign-owned firms
Panel A: Parent location
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: average wage for wage for wage for
wage production non-production managerial
workers workers workers
parent HI 0.396*** 0.242** 0.314*** 0.370***
[0.097] [0.107] [0.102] [0.105]
parent LMI 0.373*** 0.050 0.196** 0.385***
[0.143] [0.079] [0.084] [0.101]
parent SSA 0.075 -0.051 0.219** 0.127
[0.115] [0.084] [0.090] [0.090]
Obs 2513 2384 2361 2439
R2 0.83 0.90 0.89 0.90
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentLMI
(P-value) 0.88 0.048 0.23 0.89
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.015 0.0066 0.41 0.034
F-test H0:
βparentLMI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.081 0.30 0.82 0.027
Panel B: greenfield FDI, MOFA status, principal motive for foreign investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: average wage for wage for wage for
wage production non-production managerial
workers workers workers
greenfield FDI -0.039 -0.080 -0.119 -0.264**
[0.137] [0.096] [0.130] [0.128]
MOFA 0.004 0.048 0.014 0.086
[0.299] [0.135] [0.135] [0.158]
market access 0.330 0.130 0.364** 0.504***
[0.307] [0.153] [0.166] [0.180]
low cost 0.440 0.440 0.285 0.307
[0.542] [0.344] [0.277] [0.259]
input access -0.018 0.215 0.048 0.405
[0.348] [0.194] [0.204] [0.262]
join partner 0.783 -0.338* 0.116 0.269
[0.605] [0.178] [0.305] [0.337]
export back home 0.243 0.151 0.565** 0.642**
[0.644] [0.215] [0.260] [0.288]
TA benefits 0.992* -0.196 0.196 0.205
[0.538] [0.198] [0.309] [0.320]
other motive 0.470 -0.113 0.314 0.084
[0.365] [0.260] [0.282] [0.267]
Obs 2506 2378 2356 2434
R2 0.83 0.90 0.89 0.90
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns of both panels. Dummies take
value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except
for skill intensity and firm age. The dependent variables are in logs. The regressions include all the control
variables listed in Table 11 but their coefficient estimates are not reported for the sake of brevity. For the
description of all variables, see Table 14.
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Table 13: Average wage and foreign ownership (governance quality and social inclusion)
Panel A: Governance quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: average wage for wage for wage for
wage production non-production managerial
workers workers workers
foreign 0.696 0.646* 0.569* 1.124***
[0.569] [0.371] [0.342] [0.383]
foreign * governance -0.007 -0.010 -0.006 -0.015**
[0.010] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
Obs 2517 2387 2364 2442
R2 0.83 0.90 0.89 0.90
Panel B: Social inclusion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: average wage for wage for wage for
wage production non-production managerial
workers workers workers
foreign 2.366*** 1.203** 0.665 2.468***
[0.842] [0.574] [0.533] [0.638]
foreign * social inclusion -0.571** -0.304* -0.115 -0.599***
[0.232] [0.156] [0.145] [0.172]
Obs 2517 2387 2364 2442
R2 0.83 0.90 0.89 0.90
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns of both panels. Dummies take
value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except
for skill intensity and firm age. The dependent variables are in logs. The regressions include all the control
variables listed in Table 11 but their coefficient estimates are not reported for the sake of brevity. For the
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A Appendix: Additional descriptive statistics
Table A1: Domestic and foreign-owned firms by industry
No Yes Total
ISIC Rev. 1.1 Name # % # % # %
1 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 100 49.8 101 50.2 201 100
2 Forestry, logging and related service activities 6 54.5 5 45.5 11 100
5 Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms; service activities incidental to fishing 2 20 8 80 10 100
10 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 8 42.1 11 57.9 19 100
11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying 6 40 9 60 15 100
12 Mining of uranium and thorium ores 1 50 1 50 2 100
13 Mining of metal ores 2 11.8 15 88.2 17 100
14 Other mining and quarrying 18 52.9 16 47.1 34 100
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 465 68 219 32 684 100
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 4 20 16 80 20 100
17 Manufacture of textiles 74 62.7 44 37.3 118 100
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 111 57.5 82 42.5 193 100
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 66 70.2 28 29.8 94 100
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 102 75.6 33 24.4 135 100
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 61 61.6 38 38.4 99 100
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 208 83.5 41 16.5 249 100
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 4 33.3 8 66.7 12 100
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 152 53 135 47 287 100
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 140 49.5 143 50.5 283 100
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 109 67.3 53 32.7 162 100
27 Manufacture of basic metals 37 46.8 42 53.2 79 100
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 208 65 112 35 320 100
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 57 64 32 36 89 100
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 0 0 3 100 3 100
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 24 50 24 50 48 100
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 1 11.1 8 88.9 9 100
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 9 52.9 8 47.1 17 100
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 17 54.8 14 45.2 31 100
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 9 64.3 5 35.7 14 100
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 126 70.8 52 29.2 178 100
37 Recycling 4 40 6 60 10 100
38 Other manufacturing 10 58.8 7 41.2 17 100
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 27 64.3 15 35.7 42 100
41 Collection, purification and distribution of water 1 50 1 50 2 100
45 Construction 276 68.1 129 31.9 405 100
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 158 68.1 74 31.9 232 100
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 231 57.9 168 42.1 399 100
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods 259 67.4 125 32.6 384 100
55 Hotels and restaurants 223 69.5 98 30.5 321 100
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 115 72.3 44 27.7 159 100
61 Water transport 9 37.5 15 62.5 24 100
62 Air transport 8 34.8 15 65.2 23 100
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 66 69.5 29 30.5 95 100
64 Post and telecommunications 39 43.3 51 56.7 90 100
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 91 48.7 96 51.3 187 100
66 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 53 57.6 39 42.4 92 100
67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 17 73.9 6 26.1 23 100
70 Real estate activities 51 67.1 25 32.9 76 100
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods 11 61.1 7 38.9 18 100
72 Computer and related activities 25 61 16 39 41 100
73 Research and development 1 50 1 50 2 100
74 Other business activities 201 65.5 106 34.5 307 100
75 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 5 100 0 0 5 100
80 Education 19 65.5 10 34.5 29 100
85 Health and social work 11 84.6 2 15.4 13 100
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 32 91.4 3 8.6 35 100
91 Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. 1 100 0 0 1 100
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 13 68.4 6 31.6 19 100
93 Other service activities 6 85.7 1 14.3 7 100
95 Private households with employed persons 1 100 0 0 1 100
Total 4091 63 2401 37 6492 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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B Appendix: Additional results tables
Table B1: Employment by contract type, unpaid work and parent location of foreign-owned
firms (China excluded from LMI group)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var: total permanent temporary temporary part-time part-time unpaid unpaid
employment employment employment employment employment employment work work
(share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
parent HI -0.08 0.02 -0.09** -0.03 -0.02 0.004 -0.06* -0.009**
[0.05] [0.02] [0.05] [0.02] [0.04] [0.007] [0.03] [0.004]
parent LMI (excl. China) -0.1** 0.06** -0.06 -0.06*** 0.05 0.007 -0.07** -0.005
[0.04] [0.02] [0.06] [0.02] [0.04] [0.009] [0.04] [0.004]
parent SSA -0.1** 0.07** -0.06 -0.08** -0.02 0.0004 -0.09 -0.004
[0.06] [0.03] [0.07] [0.03] [0.05] [0.01] [0.06] [0.004]
sales 0.9*** 0.04*** 0.006 -0.04*** 0.02** -0.003 -0.004 -0.004***
[0.01] [0.005] [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.002] [0.006] [0.001]
productivity -0.9*** -0.05*** 0.005 0.05*** -0.03*** 0.002 0.002 0.004**
[0.02] [0.007] [0.01] [0.007] [0.010] [0.003] [0.008] [0.002]
skill intensity 0.3*** -0.1*** 0.1* 0.1*** 0.07 0.003 -0.04 0.006
[0.08] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.01] [0.04] [0.01]
wage 0.04*** -0.005 0.001 0.007 -0.010 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002
[0.01] [0.005] [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.002] [0.006] [0.001]
training -0.02 0.01 0.0007 -0.02** 0.02 0.004 0.03** 0.003
[0.02] [0.010] [0.02] [0.009] [0.02] [0.004] [0.01] [0.002]
capital intensity 0.02*** -0.008** 0.01** 0.008** 0.01*** 0.0006 0.002 -0.0009
[0.008] [0.004] [0.007] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.0007]
input intensity 0.009 -0.005 -0.0002 0.005 -0.007 0.0009 0.0009 0.00007
[0.009] [0.004] [0.008] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.0005]
firm age 0.0002 0.00008 0.0002 -0.00009 0.0003 0.00003 -0.00002 0.00004
[0.0006] [0.0003] [0.0006] [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0001] [0.0004] [0.00005]
affiliated parties -0.005 -0.006 0.03** 0.008 0.01 -0.002 0.004 0.002
[0.01] [0.007] [0.01] [0.006] [0.01] [0.002] [0.009] [0.002]
local backward link 0.03 -0.02* 0.09*** 0.03** -0.005 -0.01 -0.002 0.002
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.006] [0.02] [0.002]
foreign backward link 0.02 -0.02 0.08*** 0.02* 0.02 -0.005 -0.010 0.00006
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.006] [0.02] [0.003]
local forward link 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.003 0.06*** 0.02*** -0.01 -0.00010
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.004] [0.02] [0.002]
export status 0.1*** -0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.007 -0.004 0.009 0.003
[0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.004] [0.02] [0.003]
import competition -0.006 0.007 0.03 -0.01 0.005 0.005 0.02 -0.002
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.005] [0.02] [0.003]
local competition 0.002 -0.006 0.03 0.0008 0.004 0.003 0.01 0.002
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.004] [0.02] [0.003]
Obs 2513 2513 2510 2506 2508 2498 2350 2442
R2 0.88 0.23 0.23 0.040 0.046
Pseudo−R2 0.13 0.092 0.094
Log − likelihood -1451.1 -1006.3 -678.0
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentLMI
(P-value) 0.57 0.20 0.52 0.16 0.10 0.70 0.75 0.22
F-test H0:
βparentLMI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.32 0.15 0.67 0.13 0.87 0.80 0.62 0.17
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.56 0.63 0.94 0.67 0.24 0.61 0.79 0.73
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in columns 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8. Probit estimations with country and industry dummies in columns 3, 5 and 7. Dummies
take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill intensity and firm age. All non-dummy dependent variables
are also in logs except for those which represent non-monetary shares. The coefficient estimates in columns 3, 5 and 7 represent marginal effects. For the description of the variables,
see Table B9.
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Table B2: Employment by contract type, unpaid work and parent location of foreign-owned
firms (China and India excluded from LMI group)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var: total permanent temporary temporary part-time part-time unpaid unpaid
employment employment employment employment employment employment work work
(share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share) (dummy) (share)
parent HI -0.07 0.02 -0.09** -0.02 -0.03 0.001 -0.05* -0.009**
[0.05] [0.02] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.008] [0.03] [0.004]
parent LMI (excl. China/India) -0.1*** 0.06*** -0.06 -0.06*** 0.02 -0.003 -0.07* -0.006*
[0.05] [0.02] [0.06] [0.02] [0.05] [0.005] [0.04] [0.004]
parent SSA -0.1** 0.07** -0.06 -0.07** -0.02 -0.001 -0.09 -0.004
[0.06] [0.03] [0.07] [0.03] [0.05] [0.01] [0.06] [0.003]
sales 0.9*** 0.04*** 0.007 -0.04*** 0.02** -0.003 -0.004 -0.004***
[0.01] [0.005] [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.002] [0.006] [0.001]
productivity -0.9*** -0.05*** 0.005 0.05*** -0.03*** 0.001 0.002 0.004**
[0.02] [0.007] [0.01] [0.007] [0.010] [0.003] [0.008] [0.002]
skill intensity 0.3*** -0.1*** 0.1* 0.1*** 0.07 0.003 -0.04 0.006
[0.08] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.01] [0.04] [0.01]
wage 0.04*** -0.005 0.0010 0.007 -0.009 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002
[0.01] [0.005] [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.002] [0.006] [0.001]
training -0.02 0.01 0.0010 -0.02** 0.02 0.004 0.03** 0.003
[0.02] [0.010] [0.02] [0.009] [0.02] [0.004] [0.01] [0.002]
capital intensity 0.02*** -0.008** 0.01** 0.008** 0.01*** 0.0005 0.002 -0.0009
[0.008] [0.003] [0.007] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.0007]
input intensity 0.009 -0.005 -0.0002 0.005 -0.007 0.0009 0.0007 0.00007
[0.009] [0.004] [0.008] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.0005]
firm age 0.0002 0.00007 0.0002 -0.00007 0.0003 0.00002 0.000003 0.00004
[0.0006] [0.0003] [0.0006] [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0001] [0.0004] [0.00005]
affiliated parties -0.006 -0.006 0.03** 0.007 0.02 -0.001 0.003 0.002
[0.01] [0.007] [0.01] [0.006] [0.01] [0.002] [0.009] [0.001]
local backward link 0.03 -0.02* 0.09*** 0.03** -0.004 -0.01 -0.002 0.002
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.006] [0.02] [0.002]
foreign backward link 0.02 -0.02 0.08*** 0.02 0.02 -0.005 -0.01 0.00001
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.006] [0.02] [0.003]
local forward link 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.004 0.06*** 0.02*** -0.01 -0.00008
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.004] [0.02] [0.002]
export status 0.1*** -0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.007 -0.003 0.009 0.003
[0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.004] [0.02] [0.003]
import competition -0.005 0.007 0.03 -0.01 0.003 0.005 0.02 -0.002
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.005] [0.02] [0.003]
local competition 0.004 -0.007 0.03 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.01 0.002
[0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.004] [0.02] [0.002]
Obs 2513 2513 2510 2506 2508 2498 2350 2442
R2 0.88 0.23 0.23 0.039 0.046
Pseudo−R2 0.13 0.092 0.094
Log − likelihood -1451.0 -1007.0 -678.3
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentLMI
(P-value) 0.40 0.12 0.65 0.16 0.35 0.49 0.71 0.46
F-test H0:
βparentLMI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.32 0.14 0.67 0.12 0.82 0.84 0.60 0.17
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.74 0.81 0.97 0.68 0.55 0.87 0.83 0.50
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in columns 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8. Probit estimations with country and industry dummies in columns 3, 5 and 7. Dummies take
value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill intensity and firm age. All non-dummy dependent variables are also in logs
except for those which represent non-monetary shares. The coefficient estimates in columns 3, 5 and 7 represent marginal effects. For the description of the variables, see Table B9.
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Table B3: Permanent full-time employment and foreign ownership (firing costs)
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var: permanent full-time workers (share)
production non-production managerial
foreign 0.05** -0.04* -0.005
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
foreign * firing cost -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001]
sales 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
productivity -0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
skill intensity -0.8*** -0.1***
[0.03] [0.03]
wage -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
training -0.02*** 0.02** 0.02***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006]
capital intensity -0.001 0.002 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
input intensity -0.002 0.002 0.0003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
firm age -0.0007*** 0.0006** 0.0001
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
affiliated parties -0.01** 0.01* 0.005
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
local backward link 0.02 -0.02 -0.005
[0.01] [0.01] [0.010]
foreign backward link -0.03*** 0.02** 0.002
[0.01] [0.01] [0.010]
local forward link 0.02 -0.01 -0.002
[0.01] [0.01] [0.009]
export status 0.005 -0.01 -0.003
[0.010] [0.009] [0.008]
import competition -0.02 0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.010]
local competition -0.01 0.01 0.004
[0.01] [0.01] [0.008]
Obs 2517 2517 2517
R2 0.59 0.37 0.16
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns. Dummies
take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables
are in logs except for skill intensity and firm age. The dependent variables are not in logs.
Skill intensity is dropped from the regression in column 3. For the description of the
variables, see Table B9.
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Table B4: Average wage in foreign and domestic MNEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: average wage for wage for wage for
wage production non-production managerial
workers workers workers
foreign 0.047 0.059 0.218** 0.162
[0.128] [0.113] [0.110] [0.127]
sales 0.045 0.110*** 0.085** 0.095**
[0.039] [0.031] [0.034] [0.038]
productivity 0.203** -0.034 0.031 0.058
[0.087] [0.044] [0.048] [0.053]
skill intensity 0.982*** 0.709* 0.268 -0.000468
[0.328] [0.383] [0.249] [0.260]
training 0.211** 0.111 0.237*** 0.137*
[0.089] [0.083] [0.072] [0.082]
capital intensity 0.035 0.019 -0.001 0.004
[0.045] [0.022] [0.023] [0.029]
input intensity 0.009 -0.004 -0.011 -0.004
[0.067] [0.031] [0.029] [0.038]
firm age 0.003 0.004** 0.001 0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
affiliated parties 0.003 0.030 -0.028 0.015
[0.048] [0.045] [0.035] [0.039]
local backward link 0.024 0.167 -0.136 0.016
[0.136] [0.107] [0.126] [0.123]
foreign backward link 0.052 0.285** 0.152 -0.020
[0.175] [0.131] [0.133] [0.159]
local forward link -0.120 -0.110 0.046 -0.035
[0.108] [0.085] [0.079] [0.089]
export status -0.112 0.011 0.011 -0.088
[0.103] [0.080] [0.084] [0.105]
import competition 0.012 -0.171* 0.007 -0.102
[0.138] [0.094] [0.109] [0.111]
local competition -0.003 -0.115 -0.055 -0.087
[0.121] [0.085] [0.083] [0.093]
Obs 501 471 492 493
R2 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.87
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns. The sample does not
include domestic non-MNEs. Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-
dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill intensity and firm age. The dependent variables
are in logs. For the description of the variables, see Table B9.
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Table B5: Average wage and parent location of foreign-owned firms (China excluded from
LMI group)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: average wage for wage for wage for
wage production non-production managerial
workers workers workers
parent HI 0.416*** 0.235** 0.310*** 0.355***
[0.096] [0.107] [0.101] [0.105]
parent LMI (excl. China) 0.496*** 0.030 0.203** 0.375***
[0.147] [0.081] [0.085] [0.103]
parent SSA 0.089 -0.056 0.216** 0.117
[0.115] [0.085] [0.090] [0.090]
sales -0.040* 0.040*** 0.108*** 0.103***
[0.022] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016]
productivity 0.321*** 0.040* 0.011 0.021
[0.048] [0.024] [0.029] [0.027]
skill intensity 0.449*** 0.254* 0.138 -0.140
[0.151] [0.154] [0.129] [0.136]
training 0.084** 0.045 0.115*** 0.106***
[0.041] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034]
capital intensity 0.076*** 0.007 -0.013 0.006
[0.019] [0.011] [0.013] [0.013]
input intensity 0.063** 0.008 -0.003 0.016
[0.029] [0.015] [0.018] [0.017]
firm age 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
affiliated parties -0.027 0.042 -0.017 0.022
[0.033] [0.031] [0.026] [0.026]
local backward link 0.096* 0.071 -0.078 -0.006
[0.055] [0.049] [0.052] [0.049]
foreign backward link 0.112* 0.072 0.095** 0.048
[0.064] [0.046] [0.047] [0.045]
local forward link 0.048 0.021 0.070 0.047
[0.054] [0.051] [0.054] [0.050]
export status 0.035 0.102** 0.112** 0.023
[0.055] [0.049] [0.049] [0.048]
import competition -0.030 -0.043 -0.020 -0.074
[0.067] [0.053] [0.057] [0.055]
local competition -0.089* 0.051 -0.041 -0.031
[0.054] [0.049] [0.050] [0.048]
Obs 2513 2384 2361 2439
R2 0.83 0.90 0.89 0.90
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentLMI
(P-value) 0.61 0.027 0.29 0.86
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.013 0.0070 0.41 0.037
F-test H0:
βparentLMI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.020 0.36 0.90 0.030
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if the
statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill intensity
and firm age. The dependent variables are in logs. For the description of the variables, see Table B9.
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Table B6: Average wage and parent location of foreign-owned firms (China and India excluded
from LMI group)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: average wage for wage for wage for
wage production non-production managerial
workers workers workers
parent HI 0.401*** 0.231** 0.288*** 0.351***
[0.096] [0.105] [0.099] [0.103]
parent LMI (excl. China/India) 0.549*** 0.017 0.149 0.444***
[0.165] [0.084] [0.093] [0.114]
parent SSA 0.077 -0.059 0.201** 0.113
[0.115] [0.084] [0.089] [0.089]
sales -0.039* 0.040*** 0.109*** 0.103***
[0.022] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016]
productivity 0.321*** 0.040* 0.010 0.021
[0.048] [0.024] [0.029] [0.027]
skill intensity 0.445*** 0.254* 0.138 -0.139
[0.151] [0.154] [0.129] [0.136]
training 0.081** 0.045 0.115*** 0.104***
[0.041] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034]
capital intensity 0.076*** 0.007 -0.013 0.006
[0.019] [0.011] [0.013] [0.013]
input intensity 0.063** 0.008 -0.002 0.016
[0.029] [0.015] [0.018] [0.017]
firm age 0.005*** 0.003** 0.002** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
affiliated parties -0.023 0.044 -0.011 0.023
[0.033] [0.030] [0.025] [0.025]
local backward link 0.098* 0.072 -0.077 -0.006
[0.055] [0.049] [0.052] [0.049]
foreign backward link 0.116* 0.072 0.098** 0.051
[0.064] [0.046] [0.047] [0.044]
local forward link 0.043 0.019 0.063 0.044
[0.053] [0.050] [0.054] [0.049]
export status 0.036 0.102** 0.114** 0.025
[0.055] [0.049] [0.049] [0.048]
import competition -0.035 -0.044 -0.024 -0.074
[0.067] [0.053] [0.057] [0.055]
local competition -0.097* 0.050 -0.047 -0.036
[0.054] [0.049] [0.050] [0.047]
Obs 2513 2384 2361 2439
R2 0.83 0.90 0.89 0.90
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentLMI
(P-value) 0.38 0.028 0.20 0.45
F-test H0:
βparentHI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.014 0.0070 0.44 0.037
F-test H0:
βparentLMI = βparentSSA
(P-value) 0.013 0.44 0.65 0.010
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if the statement
holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill intensity and firm age. The
dependent variables are in logs. For the description of the variables, see Table B9.
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Table B7: Average wage and foreign ownership (rule of law)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: average wage for wage for wage for
wage production non-production managerial
workers workers workers
foreign 0.307 0.315 0.186 0.884***
[0.345] [0.243] [0.244] [0.276]
foreign * rule of law 0.0002 -0.003 0.001 -0.009**
[0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
sales -0.036 0.041*** 0.107*** 0.105***
[0.022] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016]
productivity 0.317*** 0.039 0.011 0.018
[0.048] [0.024] [0.029] [0.027]
skill intensity 0.464*** 0.264* 0.141 -0.127
[0.150] [0.153] [0.129] [0.136]
training 0.088** 0.044 0.115*** 0.111***
[0.041] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034]
capital intensity 0.077*** 0.008 -0.012 0.007
[0.019] [0.011] [0.013] [0.013]
input intensity 0.064** 0.008 -0.003 0.018
[0.029] [0.015] [0.018] [0.016]
firm age 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
affiliated parties -0.015 0.050* -0.015 0.019
[0.034] [0.029] [0.025] [0.025]
local backward link 0.102* 0.077 -0.075 -0.002
[0.056] [0.049] [0.051] [0.049]
foreign backward link 0.112* 0.070 0.095** 0.048
[0.064] [0.046] [0.047] [0.044]
local forward link 0.037 0.019 0.070 0.045
[0.054] [0.050] [0.054] [0.049]
export status 0.034 0.106** 0.115** 0.024
[0.055] [0.049] [0.049] [0.048]
import competition -0.044 -0.049 -0.023 -0.080
[0.067] [0.053] [0.056] [0.054]
local competition -0.096* 0.051 -0.041 -0.031
[0.054] [0.049] [0.050] [0.047]
Obs 2517 2387 2364 2442
R2 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.90
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if
the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill
intensity and firm age. The dependent variables are in logs. For the description of the variables, see
Table B9.
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Table B8: Average wage and foreign ownership (social protection)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var: average wage for wage for wage for
wage production non-production managerial
workers workers workers
foreign 1.133** 0.406 0.988** 2.315***
[0.503] [0.401] [0.480] [0.532]
foreign * social protection -0.236 -0.085 -0.214 -0.580***
[0.145] [0.112] [0.132] [0.149]
sales -0.036 0.041*** 0.108*** 0.107***
[0.022] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016]
productivity 0.316*** 0.039 0.009 0.014
[0.048] [0.024] [0.029] [0.027]
skill intensity 0.466*** 0.264* 0.144 -0.116
[0.151] [0.153] [0.129] [0.135]
training 0.090** 0.044 0.116*** 0.112***
[0.041] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034]
capital intensity 0.076*** 0.009 -0.012 0.007
[0.019] [0.011] [0.013] [0.013]
input intensity 0.065** 0.007 -0.002 0.019
[0.029] [0.015] [0.018] [0.017]
firm age 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
affiliated parties -0.016 0.050* -0.016 0.017
[0.034] [0.029] [0.025] [0.025]
local backward link 0.100* 0.075 -0.077 -0.006
[0.056] [0.049] [0.051] [0.049]
foreign backward link 0.114* 0.069 0.096** 0.048
[0.064] [0.046] [0.047] [0.044]
local forward link 0.036 0.019 0.068 0.042
[0.054] [0.051] [0.054] [0.049]
export status 0.033 0.105** 0.116** 0.020
[0.055] [0.049] [0.049] [0.048]
import competition -0.043 -0.049 -0.022 -0.080
[0.067] [0.053] [0.056] [0.054]
local competition -0.095* 0.051 -0.040 -0.033
[0.054] [0.049] [0.050] [0.047]
Obs 2517 2387 2364 2442
R2 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.90
Notes: OLS estimations with country and industry dummies in all columns. Dummies take value 1 if the
statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All non-dummy explanatory variables are in logs except for skill intensity
and firm age. The dependent variables are in logs. For the description of the variables, see Table B9.
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